This article was published by Al Jazeera International.
Turkey chose the day of
the Greek prime minister’s visit to place a $6.1mn bounty on the heads of Turkish eight army officers seeking
asylum in Greece. This emphasis had been suggested days earlier, when the
powerful National Security Council in Ankara issued a demand for their
extradition, despite the fact that the Greek Supreme Court has forbidden this
on humanitarian grounds.
The court’s decision is
unreviewable, but the Turkish government suspects the men of helping to plot a
failed coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in July 2016. The
men commandeered a helicopter to escape Turkey and seek asylum in Greece.
To the conservative
Greek opposition, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras had walked into a trap. “This
visit is poorly prepared by the Greek side, and augurs ill for Greek interests
and Greek-Turkish relations,” declared Greek shadow foreign minister Yiorgos
Koumoutsakos.
“For the last 18 months,
Turkey has toughened its rhetoric and backed that up with actions. The result
is that the two countries are in a state of constant confrontation. Nothing has
occurred to make us believe in a breakthrough,” says Angelos Syrigos, an expert
in international law at Panteion University in Athens, and a candidate with the
conservative New Democracy party.
According to one retired
Greek diplomat, Tsipras took the political cost of an embarrassing visit to
Ankara to establish a line of communication with Erdogan amid worsening
relations.
In the last two years,
Greece has registered record numbers of territorial and airspace violations by
Turkey in the Aegean. Erdogan’s visit to Athens 14 months ago remains a
watershed moment in Greek-Turkish relations. In addition to extradition of the
officers, Erdogan demand an amendment of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.
The Lausanne Treaty not
only delineated the Turkish state. It normalized Greek-Turkish relations after
a century of war. In Greek policy circles it is considered untouchable. The
call to revisit it suggested a broader revisionism of the Greek-Turkish status
quo.
In 1923, both Greece and Turkey maintained
territorial waters of three nautical miles in the Aegean Sea. Greece extended
that to six nautical miles in 1936 and Turkey followed suit in 1964.
As a signatory to the
International Law of the Sea, Greece claims the right to extend its territorial
waters to 12 nautical miles. Because Greece owns thousands of islands, doing so
would give it possession of almost three quarters of the Aegean, and Turkey has
threatened war should this happen.
Last October, outgoing
Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzias announced imminent plans to move down this
path by extending Greece’s territorial waters along its mainland coasts and
Crete. The move left out the most contested area of Aegean islands, but it was
a clear statement of intent.
“Our foreign policy… is
addressing and implementing the expansion of our sovereign territory for the
first time since the absorption of the Dodecanese islands,” he said, referring
to Greece’s formal inclusion in 1948 of the last territory neighbouring Greece
with a Greek population.
“The
most important thing for Turkey is the Aegean,” says Kostas Yfantis, an international relations expert at Kadir Has and
Panteion Universities. “Although we in Greece say that Turkey is the
revisionist actor in that relationship, Turks themselves point out that no,
Greece is the revisionist state, because the status quo of territorial waters
in the Aegean is six nautical miles and Greece wants to expand to 12 nautical
miles and change the status quo.”
Greece and Turkey are
also in a spat over delineation of their continental shelf, an area beyond
territorial waters where states enjoy the right to exploit undersea resources. Last October, Turkey sent a drillship
to explore the seabed near Cyprus for oil and gas, in response to a similar
exploration by Cypriots. A 1974 Turkish
invasion of Cyprus after a Greek-inspired coup continues to divide the island
and poison Greek-Turkish relations. Hydrocarbons have deepened the
disagreement. Turkey
now also threatens to explore for hydrocarbons in areas Greece claims for its
own continental shelf.
Syrigos believes
hydrocarbons have been at the root of the disagreements all along. “The
potential for oil under the Aegean in the 1970s led Turkey to dispute the
continental shelf of the Aegean and following that almost all the entire legal
regime of the Aegean,” he says. “Right now it disputes whether the small islets
not specifically named [in international treaties] belong to Greece, Greece’s
airspace, Athens’ Flight Information Region, Greece’s Search and Rescue
jurisdiction, the continental shelves established in the eastern
Mediterranean.”
Such Turkish disputatiousness and Greek defiance
nearly led to war in 1996, when Greece and Turkey sent warships and helicopters
to the Imia islets in the east Aegean. Three years later, massive earthquakes
rocked Istanbul and Athens within months of each other. The two governments
sent search-and-rescue teams to each other’s aid, and the atmosphere between
them improved dramatically.
When he announced
Greece’s imminent expansion of territorial waters, Kotzias was defiant. “In our
view the correct policy is not to say ‘we won’t extend our territorial waters
because we’re in the middle of a negotiation with Turkey about the continental
shelf,’ nor to wait until that negotiation is over, because we’re then
depriving ourselves of a right.”
In December 1999, Greece lifted its long-standing veto
on Turkish membership talks with the European Union, and the two countries
started exploratory talks that came close to resolving their territorial
differences in the Aegean. But Greece then hesitated to commit to any deal, and
18 months ago Turkey abandoned the talks altogether. Their
relationship sweetened only to bitter again. Despite their need to re-establish
a bilateral forum to discuss differences, expectations are kept to a low pitch.
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