Now that the
Greek government has made its proposals public, and the document that has been
floated is almost exactly that handed down by creditors on June 25, many are
asking what the point of the referendum was, and whether it has made any
difference to the process of reaching an agreement.
1. The main reason for Prime Minister
Alexis Tsipras calling the referendum was almost certainly to use it as
leverage against German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Presumably if the prospect of
a No vote frightened her enough, she would concede points in return for a
cancellation of the referendum.
Merkel,
however, decided to use the referendum against the Greeks, and held Tsipras to
it. Her calculation was that if she won a Yes vote that would force the
resignation of Tsipras’ government. A cross-party cabinet would be installed,
with a German choice of prime minister, as happened in 2012, when former
central banker Loukas Papademos was installed on top of a vast parliamentary majority
of five sixths.
Merkel could
enlist the European Central Bank, which cut off liquidity to the Greek banking
system and forced capital controls, shocking Greek voters and putting the
market under enormous strain. She could also enlist European Union officials,
such as Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem and European Commission
President Jean-Claude Juncker, to threaten the Greeks with a Eurozone exit if
they voted no.
But Merkel
miscalculated. European threats to Greeks may well have backfired. Tsipras was
able to enlist the desperation of 40 percent of Greek society, which now lives
under the pre-crisis poverty level of 8,767 euros a year (by tax declaration).
He could also enlist the young, one in two of whom are unemployed.
The result, however,
is irrelevant to the negotiation process. The referendum was never intended to
happen, or truly to give the Greeks a chance to reject austerity. And most
voters seem to have known this. They fully understood that they would suffer
austerity either way, so they decided to use the referendum as a symbolic “up
yours” to Merkel.
Now we are back to
business, on the basis of the same document. But Tsipras thinks he may now make it palatable by enriching it in three ways: a) by extending it to a three-year financing period, b) by accompanying it with a 35bn euro development package from the European Commission, c) by accompanying it with a rescheduling of Greek debt. The International Monetary Fund has said that Greece needs a 20-year grace period followed by a 40-year repayment schedule. It currently has a 7-year grace period followed by a 16-year repayment period. If Tsipras brings the rescheduling home, he will have fixed the biggest problem of the bailout.
2. A second reason Tsipras may have chosen
the referendum was that he preferred it to a parliamentary debate followed by a
vote that would have split his party between moderates and hardliners. The
measures would probably have passed on the strength of the opposition vote, but
the division of Syriza would probably have brought down the government.
3. Some believe that Tsipras was using the
referendum to commit
political suicide. It’s true that one crisis-era prime minister resigned (George
Papandreou) and another hastened his own demise by calling an early
parliamentary election for the country’s new president (Antonis Samaras), but
Tsipras has only been in power for five months. He carries a historic
responsibility to the left, which he brought to power for the first time. To
leave with the reputation of a failed premier who dashed all promise was
probably an even worse cross to bear than to continue dealing with Mrs. Merkel.
Has the
referendum had an effect on the outcome? It has prompted the closure of banks,
which in turn has wrought havoc with commerce and brought criticism that the ECB is playing politics. (Greece did soon after the referendum win approval for the European Stability Mechanism to buy the ECB's Greek debt). The private sector will take
months to revive, even if there is an agreement. Some entrepreneurs are talking
about relocation. In addition, the bank closure is bringing the banking sector
closer to bankruptcy and may hasten more mergers.
For more discussion about both the primary mistakes made by the Greeks, and the secondary mistakes made by creditors, you can listen to On Point, a show on Boston's WBUR.
For more discussion about both the primary mistakes made by the Greeks, and the secondary mistakes made by creditors, you can listen to On Point, a show on Boston's WBUR.
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