This article was published on Al Jazeera.
For
half a decade, Greece has become notorious for its dwindling fortunes. Its
stubborn recession has broken postwar European records. Its unemployment
levels, the highest in the European Union, threaten political stability. It
seems as though no story is too bad to be true.
Yet
days ago Greece surprised the world with two developments suggesting that it
may finally be turning a corner in this crisis.
The
first is that Greece will form the heart of the so-called Southern Gas
Corridor, an energy security strategy emanating from Brussels aimed at weaning Europe
off the dominance of Russian gas.
The
second is that Greece’s biggest port of Peiraieus, near Athens, is well on its
way to becoming Europe’s main gateway for trade with China. The projects are
worth $2.3 billion in direct investment and 2,300 construction jobs over three
years, a fact Prime Minister Antonis Samaras was quick to emphasise.
“This
is a very important vote of confidence in Greece,” he said after the
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, two thirds of which will be built across northern
Greece, was chosen as the conduit for Azeri gas to Europe. The gas, which is to
be extracted by the European-dominated Shah Deniz Consortium, is to flow in
2017. “Who would invest so much money in an economically, socially and
politically dangerous country?” Samaras rhetorically asked.
The
Institute of Economic and Industrial Research has estimated TAP‘s total
beneficial effect over its half-century lifespan at some 33 billion euros, translating
into at least 4,300 jobs on an annual basis.
No
less important is the decision by the China Ocean Shipping Company, or Cosco, to
invest $290 million in expanding its container port terminal from a capacity of
about 2.5 million 20-foot containers (or TEU) a year to 6.2 or even seven
million.
"We want to turn
Piraeus into the top port in the Mediterranean and Europe," said Wei
Jiafu, Cosco’s outgoing chairman at the inauguration ceremony. “Greece can– and I say
will – become the commercial gateway for China and Europe,” replied Samaras.
The
political timing of these announcements could hardly be better. A week earlier,
Samaras’ government was hobbled by the departure of a key coalition member,
reducing his parliamentary majority to a mere three seats.
“The
immediate priority is to bring the turnaround as quickly as possible, to defeat
unemployment, to bring investments, to avoid new austerity measures… and to
raise our geopolitical profile,” he told his reshuffled cabinet.
Tangible
economic benefits are a matter of existential importance to Samaras, who
pledged himself to an agenda of growth over austerity during last year’s
election; but the true value of the two investments arguably lies in the fact
that they place Greece at the heart of strategic European relationships with
the rest of the world.
“The political effect
of being part of such a huge undertaking firmly puts Greece on the energy
security map of Europe,” TAP’s managing director, Kjetil Tungland, told Al
Jazeera from Baku. “European gas
production is going down. Russia is almost the sole supplier. The southern
route is almost a dream about to come true. How Greece benefits from this is up
to Greece. It should have plenty of opportunities.”
The
big question is whether Greece can make the most of these opportunities. Reaping
benefits requires investment, and the country is caught in a debt trap. Last
year it spent its entire primary surplus of $16 billion servicing loans. This
year’s tax revenues are almost a billion dollars behind schedule as the
recession ploughs into its sixth year. Nor is any investment revenue
forthcoming from its privatisation plan; anything raised from asset sales must
go directly to creditors. Even EU-funded public investments don’t amount to
more than $9 billion this year, and Greece may not manage to launch enough
projects to claim the full amount.
The
cash crunch means that the government is a beggar rather than a chooser. For
example,
TAP
has announced that it will contract the operator of the Greek natural gas
distribution system, Desfa, to carry out maintenance on its pipeline. But Desfa
is about to be sold to the Shah Deniz Consortium, according to the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund, which oversees
privatisation, so the Greek state will not reap the benefits of expansion.
Divestment,
rather than investment, is the order of the day, says Stelios Stavridis, who
heads the Fund. “Public companies are falling apart. In two years’ time nothing
will be left standing because there’s no money. And the companies due to bad
management will collapse,”
Stavridis
insists that privatisation is now the key to development, because once they are
in private hands, assets’ true value will shine through. “Every boatload of
containers saves $1.5 million by coming to Peiraieus compared to going through
Rotterdam or Hamburg or elsewhere in northern Europe,” he says.
The
Fund now wants Cosco to take over the entire Peiraieus Port Authority, or OLP,
a state enterprise of dubious profitability. OLP, which currently competes with
Cosco, managed to increase its container traffic by 14 percent over three
years. During the same period, Cosco increased container traffic through its Peiraieus
terminal a dozen times over.
Cosco
says it is willing to bid for OLP, and intimates that it plans to invest massively
in other network industries that complement its European bridgehead. The reason
is that once its container capacity has expanded to seven million TEU a year,
Greece’s single-track rail line to the north will no longer suffice for
overland shipping to the Balkans and beyond.
“The state will have to consider at that
point whether it is willing and able to make the necessary investment,” says
Tasos Vamvakidis, commercial director at Cosco’s subsidiary, Piraeus Container
Terminal. “Cosco, which is making these investments here, would not want to be
at the mercy of whoever takes on the management of rail in future. We’re
interested in studying whichever proposal the government puts forward,” he told
Al Jazeera.
But
privatisations do not always go as planned, partly because Greece’s dependence on its creditors also bends it to their
political will. Last month they stymied efforts by Russia’s Gazprom to buy
Greece’s gas monopoly, DEPA, depriving it of $1.2 billion. DEPA will be
re-floated later this year to what is expected to be a narrowed field of
bidders.
“I think we
would be kidding ourselves if we denied that Greece’s negotiating position is
reduced,” says Thanos Dokos, director at the Hellenic Foundation for European
and Foreign Policy, or ELIAMEP, a leading think tank. “And the investors know
this.”
“Focusing on how
to sell a dozen assets won’t bring Greece to a new period of prosperity,” Dokos
says. “If we allow a few companies in without creating a plan, we are doing
half the job. The point is to place all this into a broader strategy.”
That broader strategy has so far evaded Samaras, who
is often accused of spasmodic moves. Yet he has also demonstrated an ability to
stick to his guns in a crisis. If he can train those guns on restoring lost
Greek sovereignty as well as prosperity, he might prove that what goes down
must come up.
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